UMTS is the most popular third-generation mobile phone system at present, and the UMTS AKA is his authentication and key agreement protocol. There are some weaknesses in the existed UMTS AKA protocol, such as synchronization question, storage overhead, insecurity with leakiness authentication vector, and weakness in mutual authentications. In this paper, we use the concept of proxy key to design a more secure and more efficient UMTS AKA protocol. Our protocol not only resists above-mentioned drawback of the original UMTS AKA protocol on the security, but also can improve the performance of UMTS AKA protocol, including the computational overhead, storage overhead, and communication overhead.
Introduction
Communication technology is continuously developing and improving. AMPS (Advance Mobile Phone System), the first analog mobile phone system, was developed by AT&T in 1983. It is generally referred to as the first generation (1G) of mobile telecommunications. The main weakness of the AMPS is that it is easily susceptible to eavesdropping. In 1990, the ETSI (European Telecommunication Standards Institute) proposed a digital mobile phone system which is known as GSM [11, 19] (Global System for Mobile Communication), the second generation (2G) of mobile telecommunication. The GSM is the most widespread mobile communication system currently in use. Since the bandwidth of GSM cannot cope with many new applications of mobile communications, several third generation (3G) mobile telecommunication systems have been proposed [12, 21, 30] . The UMTS (Universal Mobile Telecommunication System) is the most universally utilized among those proposed by 3GPP [25] .
The UMTS AKA (Authentication and Key Agreement) [5, 8, 10, 18, 22, 28] protocol was established for 3GPP to solve authentication and key agreement problems. The key point of UMTS AKA protocol was uses a key which is shared between the USIM (Universal Subscriber Identity Module) on the cell phone and the AuC (Authentication Centre) in the user's HE (Home Environment) to achieve mutual authentication by both the user and the network. Moreover, the USIM and the HE keep track of the counters' SQN (Sequence Number) respectively to support network authentication and prevent replay attack [24, 26] .
Many papers [9, 13, 29] have stated that only asymmetric cryptography can solve the security threats of the third generation mobile phone system. They used the techniques of asymmetric cryptography, such as the RSA [27] , the PKI [7, 14] , and the certificate [20] to solve authentication and key establishment issues. Asymmetric cryptography compared to symmetric cryptography demands more computational costs. Therefore, if it is employed, mobile equipment must be expected to have the calculation ability to meet these demands. Thus, although asymmetric cryptography has many advantages in authentication and key establishment, we do not discuss these in this paper. We put object at currently UMTS standard related technique.
Because what we want is a system can be implementing immediately rather than a system that is waiting for future progress.
Harn and Hsin proposed an enhanced registration and AKA procedure in 2003 [15] called ER-AKA protocol. The main characteristic of ER-AKA is to apply the hash-chain [23] for authentication. But the MS and the SN must store the lot of hash-chain which generated by itself and the other side. Current mobile equipment storage space is insufficient. So, it wills additional loader of mobile equipments and cause to practice is difficulty.
In 2005, Zhang and Fang proposed an adaptive protocol for mobile authentication and key agreement, called AP-AKA [31] protocol. Their protocols primarily focused on working out the SN camouflage problem. Their idea was to enclose both identity and randomness in the message authentication code. But their methods only help the HE solve problem of the validation authentication request. Also, in other aspects, it cannot increase safety. The related reasons will discuss behind the section. Hung and Li have proposed an UMTS X-AKA protocol [17] in 2005 afterward.
X-AKA shifts the focal point to the bandwidth consumption and the space overhead.
They proposed a temporary key concept improves the insufficiency of original UMTS AKA protocol. However, X-AKA protocol also has some may improve. There are, some key generation function and message authentication code function cannot found on the 3GPP standards and some MAC usages are not necessary.
In 2009, Hu et al. [16] exchanged the original role of the work in the UMTS AKA protocol and proposed a new UMTS AKA protocol aimed at less delay. The protocol does not use the authentication vector, MS calculates an authentication token, HE calculation of the corresponding Res, as is the SN responsible for verification. However, despite of such a way that reduces the fixed network traffic but increased traffic for mobile devices.
Through the literature, some drawbacks can be found in the UMTS AKA protocol and listed as follows:
1. Synchronization difficulty with SQN: SQN is a sequence number which is kept and maintained in both MS (Mobile Station) and its HE. The purpose of originality is to prevent replay attack, but maintenance consists with the SQN is difficult. Every faulty transmission or authentication will lead it to be asynchronous.
Strong storage requests on the SN (Serving Network):
In the UMTS AKA protocol, when an MS enters a service scope of SN, SN gets n sets of AV (authentication vector) from user's HE and stores it for authenticate the MS on the later. When a lot of MS come together in an SN's service, the SN needs many storage spaces.
3. The authentication vector (AV) leakiness will cause insecurity: AV included n sets of related parameter that can represent HE to mutual authenticate with MS. It is generated by the MS's HE and transmitted to the current service network (SN) while a MS enter an SN's service. When the MS roams around in different service networks, the unused authentication vectors will transfer along with the MS's position to the current service network. Thus, the risk of AV disclosure is raised.
Weakness for mutual authentication:
Observing the UMTS AKA protocol, one will find that the SN did not yield a unique status with MS. It uses the AV that the HE provides to win the MS's confidence. So, MS can only ensure that the AV is correct, but cannot promise that the SN is legal.
In order to solve the weakness of the UMTS AKA protocol, we propose an improved protocol to deal with authentication and key agreement problems in the UMTS protocol. We will first introduce the UMTS AKA protocol in Section 2.
Then our improved protocol is described in Section 3. The computational overhead, storage overhead, and communication overhead of ER-AKA, AP-AKA, and our scheme are discussed and compared thereafter. Finally, the conclusions are presented in the last session of this paper.
Overview of the UMTS AKA Protocol
The UMTS AKA protocol (Shown as Figure 1 ) can be divided into two phases.
One is the distribution of authentication vectors phase, another is authentication and key establishment phase. 
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If the SQN and M AC are positive, the MS confirms that the SN is a legitimate service network. In the above mentioned steps, the MS will authenticate the SN then sends back a RES which it calculates in above Item 4, to the SN. The SN compares the RES with the XRES within AU T H. If they are equal, it indicates that the MS is a legal user. The proxy key is produced by the HE and used to authenticate and agree keys with the MS. Thus, the SN does not need to hold the n sets of the authentication vectors. Our protocol is not the same as the UMTS AKA protocol, SN must prove that it is legal to the MS. Figure 2 illustrates our improved protocol.
As Figure 2 shows, two phases can be found. One is the distribution of proxy keys from the HE to the SN. Another is the authentication and key establishment.
The details of the two phases are described as follows.
Distribution of Proxy Key from the HE to the SN
The purpose of this phase is to produce a proxy key and deliver the proxy key from the HE to the SN. The proxy key will be used for authentication between the SN and the MS in the future. The first time that the MS arrives at an SN service scope, this phase will be enforced. Details given as follows:
1. The MS randomly generates a 128-bit number as a Seed.
The MS calculates the
. K is a secure key which is shared between the MS's USIM and the MS's HE.
MS deliver (IM SI, Seed) to SN.
4. The SN pass forward the (IM SI, Seed) to MS's HE.
5. The HE also calculates P K = f 4 K (Seed) and sends it back to the SN. The K is a secure key which is shared between the MS's USIM and the MS's HE.
6. The SN takes Seed as the RAN D1 and stores the (IM SI, P K, RAN D1) on its side.
Authentication and Key Establishment
If the MS moves within the scope of the SN, and the above mentioned phase has be enforced, then this phase will be enforced once. Details are listed as follows.
1. The SN calculates the 
Discussion and Analysis
Our AKA protocol is designed on the basic principle of the UMTS AKA protocol. Taking realistic situations into account, there are no additional mechanisms in our protocols, such as extra encryption algorithms or key generation functions. Some points for the UMTS AKA protocol are as follows.
1. Uses a secure key shared between the MS's USIM and the MS's HE to achieve mutual authentication between the user and the network.
2. Uses the challenge/response protocol to achieve maximum compatibility with the current GSM security architecture.
3. Keeps track of a sequence number SQN respectively by use of the USIM and the HE to support network authentication.
4. Compares the counter of the SQN to confirm that the authentication data is fresh to prevent replay attacks.
5. Establishes different cipher key CK and integrity key IK each time, ensures that communication contexts are kept secret and integrity maintained.
Regarding the previously mentioned five points, we will illustrate in the following four points further improvements that our enhanced protocol can achieve:
1. In addition to the original secret key that is shared between the MS and the HE, we include a proxy key P K. HE authorizes the proxy key P K to the SN to authenticate the MS. The mutual authentication between MS with SN on the UMTS AKA protocol is based on the authentication vector AV which is to be generated by the HE and usage by the SN. The SN can use the RAN D and AU T H within AV to demonstrate its legitimacy for the MS, and verify the response from the MS to confirm MS's legitimacy. Therefore the MS is mutually authenticated with the HE. The role of the SN is just an extension of the HE in this case. The MS can only trust the SN which owns the AV but cannot verify the SN. In the UMTS standard [4] , the AV alone does not merely hold the SN. When the MS roams over the other SN, the surplus unused AV s will also follow its transfer. This will result in a very high risk of the AV leaking. Our method resists this program, we don't use the AV to carry out the authentication, but rather allow the HE to authorize the SN a proxy key which the MS also can infer it. Based on the proxy key P K, mutual authentication can proceed. Moreover, unlike the AKA protocol which requires more storage to store the n sets of the AV on the SN, we only need to store a proxy key P K on the SN. Therefore, our protocol does not transmit the P K to other service networks. When the MS leaves the current service network, establishing a fresh P K again is necessary. Please notes the P K was generated by f 4 K (Seed) and the Seed is select by MS. So the P K isn't that the valid permanence. Since the MS roaming around to a new SN or communication over the limit times, the distribution of proxy key phase will be rerun and the P K will be re-drawn up. If there is any malicious attacker sent the MS's IMSI and Seed SN in order to attempt and influence the connection between MS and SN, it will not be succeed. Because when MS finds the connection problems, it will re-send its IMSI and Seed to re-create a new PK. Since our protocol governing the phase of the distribution proxy key does not need a very large computational overhead and storage space, the capability question will not take place.
2. In the original UMTS AKA protocol, the SN authenticates the MS by the challenge/response method, and the MS authenticates the SN by the message authentication code (MAC) that generated by the HE then pass to SN. In our enhanced protocol, both the MS and the SN mutually authenticate by the challenge/response method. In other words, our enhanced protocol enables immediate authentication between the MS with the SN, rather than mediate authentication between the MS and the MS's HE on the original UMTS AKA protocol. The advance is it can achieve genuine mutual authentication, and the both sides have the fair treatment. Moreover, the stronger mutual authentication is achieved. In conclusion, our enhanced protocol has some advantages over the UMTS AKA protocol. These are stated as follows.
1. Strong mutual authentication: This has been already introduced above. The mutual challenge/response method established in our protocol are better than the one way authentication method in the UMTS AKA protocol.
2. Low storage space: In our protocol, the SN only holds a proxy key P K. This can perform a certification of infinite time while the proxy key P K is being established. The original UMTS AKA protocol of the SN must hold n sets of AV , and can only certify n time. Our P K can be used to authenticate unlimited times, but we suggest limiting its suitability because the long term key can easily attain the security threshold.
3. Low computational overhead: The HE does not require pre-computing authentication vectors in our protocol. In addition, it simplifies the network authentication method by replacing message authentication codes with challenge/response. Also, The MS reduces computational overhead.
Low network bandwidth: Since authentication vectors do not meet in our
protocol, it is not necessary to deliver great authentication vectors over the networks whether HE deliver to SN or SN deliver to next SN.
Comparisons
In the above section, we already introduced the UMTS AKA protocol and our protocol. In this section, we will first simply explain before introducing this article of ER-AKA and AP-AKA. Then compare these protocols and our protocol of merits and shortcomings. In order to solve the programs, they have substituted a temporary key mechanism for the sequence number determination. SN uses the temporary key which HE granted to replace the original authentication vector to mutual authentication with MS.
ER-AKA, AP-AKA and X-AKA Protocol
Because has cancelled the authentication vector, therefore does not need to deliver and to store up it, and also to solve the shortcomings of the UMTS AKA protocol. Figure 5 is the X-AKA protocol. It looks like well but it is not perfect. First, the temporary key generation function f x cannot be found among the 3GPP standard.
And their message authentication code function f1 usage is different with the 3GPP standard. These cause some compatibility problems for the X-AKA protocol in reallife applications. Otherwise, the message authentication code M AC u is necessary in the protocol. It is a redundant procedure because a false random number t cannot performance. This will obtain the confirmation in afterward section.
Computational Overhead
In the mobile communication environment, mobile equipment usually doesn't have the height computing capability. Since the computational overhead will decide the practicability of the UMTS AKA protocol. There are three main members in the mobile communication environment; they're the MS, SN and the HE. Among them, only the MS is mobile equipment, the SN and the HN is the fixed facilities. Therefore, the computational overhead on the MS has to as much as possible reduced.
And SN and HN can share one more.We collect and compare the computational overheads of these AKA protocols in Table 1 . We cannot value their computational overhead because the different encryption function can't to compare. So we list all encryptions functions for once using on the table. In order to more clearly understand the differences between the protocols, different encryption functions are simplifies as a calculation unit for calculating their computational overload on the table.
In the UMTS AKA protocol, the computational overhead carries on the different members at a different stage. The HE shares the all computational overhead at the distribution of authentication vector phase. As well as the MS shares the all computational overhead at the authentication and key establishment phase. The SN is only delivering and comparing the message. For this reason, the HE must compute all authentication vectors for future authentication needs and the MS also compute these vectors for authentication. This method is more extreme with other methods. Whether the HE at the distribution of authentication vector phase or the MS at the authentication and key establishment phase, they share the computing overhead more than the other protocols. The AP-AKA protocol is similar to the UMTS AKA protocol. So, it also has the same condition. Different from UMTS AKA protocol, AP-AKA protocol increased some computational on the MS and the SN in the distribution of authentication vector Phase for preventing the false SN.
The ER-AKA protocol uses a different technique on the authentication. The advantage is their method that compared hash value in the authentication and key establishment phase can have the less computational overhead. But generating those hash chains is much cost at the distribution of authentication vector phase.
Our proposed is similar with X-AKA, but the efficiency is better. Moreover, our protocol is more efficient than these protocols. In the distribution of authentication vector phase, we have the best effect. Although we increased some computational overhead in the phase of authentication and key establishment but unlike the UMTS AKA and AP-AKA we equally shared it with the SN and the MS. So, one of them will not have the computational that can't bear. Furthermore, the UMTS AKA and AP-AKA have no real provide mutual authentication in the authentication and key establishment phase. This is a reason why their computational overhead is less than our protocol in this phase. The protocol of our AKA and ER-AKA have already attained real mutual authentication. Since the computing characteristic of hash chains is easy and fast, our computing overhead is worse than the ER-AKA protocol in authentication and key establishment phase. But our protocol is better than their protocol with the computing overhead in the distribution of authentication vector phase. Table 2 illustrates the comparison of storage overhead. Obviously, the ER-AKA protocol needs more space and our protocol was obviously won in this comparison. The UMTS AKA protocol and the AP-AKA protocol must store n sets of authentication vector on the SN for authentication with the MS later. Our protocol and ER-AKA protocol uses the idea of agents. SN authenticates the MS does not used the authentication vector that the HN gives, but a proxy key that the HN gives was been used. Because the ER-AKA protocol used the technique of hash chains, so it has to store more data although the effect of hash chains is better. Both X-AKA and our protocol can reduce a lot of storage overhead on MS and SN. This is a great help while the SN was work busyness and the storage ability is limited on MS.
Storage Overhead
According to the Table 2 comparisons, our proposed has the lower storage space.
Communication Overhead
The other matter on compared with those protocols is the communication overhead. Our compared method is the bits number that total delivers. The bits number of key and relate data on the UMTS AKA protocol show as Figure 6 .
Both the UMTS AKA protocol and our protocol follow the 3GPP standards so it can easily calculate the total bits numbers. AP-AKA protocol and the ER-AKA protocol uses the private key generation and encryption function which defines Table 3 shows our conclusion.
Compared our protocol with other protocols on communication overhead, our proposed is smallest than other protocols at the phase of distribution of authentication vector. In the authentication and key establishment phase, our traffic is just about the same as other protocols. Obviously we came out on top again.
Conclusions
Most of the improved AKA protocols use the other cryptographic algorithms which designed by themselves. We do not think this is a good idea because it cannot ensure its suitability for a realistic mobile-phone environment. For this reason, our protocol does not have any additional algorithms for achieve suitability on realistic mobile-phone environment. Moreover, some papers noted a defect in the UMTS AKA protocol with regards to the plain code transmission between the SN and the HE. Since the SN and the HE are immovable equipment and linked by wires, eavesdropping and distortion of their signals does not occur easily and they also have enough computing power to cope with the needs of encryption. Therefore, our protocol does not particularly illustrate the security program of this block. In fact, any cryptography mechanism can work out the security problem of this block.
This paper proposes an enhanced protocol on the UMTS AKA protocol. We use the similar technique to strengthen the original protocol and yield good results. We also repaired the defects of the UMTS AKA protocol such as reduction of storage data, enhancement of mutual authentication, and solving the program with the sequence number which was not easily maintained. We also compared our proposed with the other protocol such as UMTS AKA, ER-AKA, AP-AKA, and X-AKA on the computational overhead, storage, and communication overhead, and proved that our proposed excellence. Therefore, our proposed not only outstanding but also can be immediately adopted in the current environment.
At present, the future of 4G protocols has been proposed, such as 3GPP LTE, WiMAX. We remain committed to the continuation of the AKA protocol to enable 
Security Assumptions:
(a) It is assumed that K is a secure key which is share between the MS and his HE. (c) It is assumed that the communication between HE and SN is secure.
(a) SN|≡ SN P HE, P is the conveyance messages between SN and HE.
(b) HE|≡ SN
